How Valuable is Patent Protection? Estimates By Technology Field Using Patent Renewal Data

This paper presents quantitative estimates of the private value of property rights conferred by patent protection for different technology fields and countries of ownership. The measures are derived from parametric estimation of a model of patent renewal, using a new data set on patent renewals in France during the period 1969-1987. The results show that patent protection is a significant, but not the major, source of private returns to inventive activity and that its importance varies sharply across technology fields. The paper quantifies the equivalent subsidy to R&D generated by the patent system, characterizes variations in the value of patent rights across technology fields, countries of ownership and time, and explores the determinants of those differences.

Motivation and Sorting in Open Source Software Innovation

This paper studies the role of intrinsic motivation, reputation, and reciprocity in driving open source software innovation. Unlike previous literature based on survey data, we exploit the observed pattern of contributions - the .revealed preference. of developers - to infer the underlying incentives driving the decision to contribute source code. Using detailed information on code contributions and project membership, we classify software developers into distinct types and study how contributions from each developer type vary according to the open source license type and other project characteristics. We find that developers strongly sort by license type, project size, and corporate sponsorship, and that reciprocity is important only for a small subset of projects. We also show that contributions have a substantial impact on the performance of open source projects.open source software, innovation, incentives, intrinsic motivation, motivated agents, reputation, reciprocity

An Exploration into the Determinants of Research Intensity

This paper explores the economic factors which determine the variation of research effort across firms. The intra-industry coefficient of variation of research intensity is much larger than those of traditional factors. We show that this important fact is consistent with the theoretical argument that knowledge possesses unique economic characteristics, and that the demand for research depends both on the parameters of the production function for knowledge and on the ability of the firm to appropriate the benefits from the knowledge it produces. We propose and implement a framework for decomposing the observed intra-industry variance In research intensity into three components: demand inducement, a firm-specific structural parameter, and errors in the observed variables. The main empirical findings are that errors in the variables (especially research) are important, that very little of the structural variance in research intensity is accounted for by demand inducement, and that the bulk of the variance is related to differences in the firm-specific parameter. Both the theoretical and empirical analysis indicate that it is not reasonable to treat the demand for research in a manner analogous to the demand for traditional inputs, including capital. Substantially richer models are required to provide insight into the structure of incentives driving the demand for research.

Spreading the Word: Geography, Policy and University Knowledge Diffusion

Using new data on citations to university patents and scientific publications, and measures of distance based on Google maps, we study how geography affects university knowledge diffusion. We show that knowledge flows from patents are localized in two respects: they decline sharply with distance up to about 100 miles, and they are strongly constrained by state borders, controlling for distance. While distance also constrains knowledge spillovers from publications, the state border does not. We investigate how the strength of the state border effect varies with university and state characteristics. It is larger for patents from public, as compared to private, universities and this is partly explained by the local development policies of universities. The border effect is larger in states with stronger non-compete laws that affect intra-state labor mobility, and those with greater reliance on in-state educated scientists and engineers. We confirm the impact of non-compete statutes by studying a policy reform in Michigan that introduced such restrictions.knowledge spillovers, diffusion, geography, university technology transfer, patents, scientific publications

Strategic Patenting and Software Innovation

Strategic patenting is widely believed to raise the costs of innovating,especially in industries characterised by cumulative innovation. This paperstudies the effects of strategic patenting on R&D, patenting and marketvalue in the computer software industry. We focus on two key aspects:patent portfolio size which affects bargaining power in patent disputes, andthe fragmentation of patent rights (.patent thickets.) which increases thetransaction costs of enforcement. We develop a model that incorporates botheffects, together with R&D spillovers. Using panel data for the period 1980-99, we find evidence that both strategic patenting and R&D spilloversstrongly affect innovation and market value of software firms.patents, anti-commons, patent thickets, R&D spillovers, marketvalue

Incentives and Invention in Universities

Using data on U.S. universities, we show that universities that give higher royalty shares to faculty scientists generate greater license income, controlling for university size, academic quality, research funding and other factors. We use pre-sample data on university patenting to control for the potential endogeneity of royalty shares. We find that scientists respond both to cash royalties and to royalties used to support their research labs, suggesting both pecuniary and intrinsic (research) motivations. The incentive effects appear to be larger in private universities than in public ones, and we provide survey evidence indicating this may be related to differences in the use of performance pay, government constraints, and local development objectives of technology license offices. Royalty incentives work both by raising faculty effort and sorting scientists across universities. The effect of incentives works primarily by increasing the quality (value) rather than the quantity of inventions.royalty incentives, invention, technology licensing

Harnessing Success: Determinants of UniversityTechnology Licensing Performance

We study the impact of incentive pay, local development objectives and governmentconstraints on university licensing performance. We develop and test a simple contractingmodel of technology licensing offices, using new survey information together with paneldata on U.S. universities for 1995-99. We find that private universities are much morelikely to adopt incentive pay than public ones, but ownership does not affect licensingperformance conditional on the use of incentive pay. Adopting incentive pay is associatedwith about 30-40 percent more income per license. Universities with strong localdevelopment objectives generate about 30 percent less income per license, but are morelikely to license to local (in-state) startup companies. Stronger government constraints are'costly' in terms of foregone license income and startup activity. These results are robustto controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity.Keywords: incentives,incentives,

Incentives and Invention in Universities

We show that economic incentives affect the number and commercial value of inventions generated in universities. Using panel data for 102 U.S. universities during the period 1991-1999, we find that universities which give higher royalty shares to academic scientists generate more inventions and higher license income, controlling for other factors including university size, quality, research funding and technology licensing inputs. The incentive effects are much larger in private universities than in public ones. For private institutions there is a Laffer curve effect: raising the inventor's royalty share increases the license income retained by the university. The incentive effect appears to work both through the level of effort and sorting of academic scientists.

The Rate of Obsolescence Of Knowledge, Research Gestation Lags, and the Private Rate of Return to Research Resources

This paper points out the conceptual distinction between the rates of decay in the physical productivity of traditional capital goods and that of the appropriate revenues accruing to knowledge-producing activities, and notes that it is the latter parameter which is required in any study which constructs a stock of privately marketable knowledge. The rate of obsolescence of knowledge is estimated from a simple patent renewal and the estimates are found to be comparable to evidence provided by firms on the lifespan of the output of their R&D activities. These estimates, together with mean R&D gestation lags, are then used to correct previous estimates of the private excess rate of return to investment in research. We find that after the correction, the private excess rate of return to investment in research, at least in the early 1960's, was close to zero, which may explain why firms reduced the fraction of their resources allocated to research over the subsequent decade.

Estimates of the Value of Patent Rights in European Countries During thePost-1950 Period

This paper examines the distribution of the values of patent rights in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany during the post-1950 period. These values are inferred from the behavior of patentees with respect to payment of renewal fees on their patents. A simple economic model of renewal decisions is combined with data on the proportion of patents renewed at alternative ages and the renewal fee schedules to produce estimates of the distribution (and the total) value of patent rights in these countries. Moreover, the data indicate that there have been changes in the value distribution, and we follow these changes over the period. The empirical results of particular interest concern: the total value of patent rights and the relationship between changes in it and changes in the quantity of patents, the skew in the distribution of patent values, and the rate of obsolescence on the returns to patents.